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Mike Daisey’s False Witness 
Joshua Edelman 
 
The scandal that this chapter addresses is a recent American controversy which brings 
into sharper focus current debates over the ways in which non-fictional performance 
(whether called documentary theatre, verbatim theatre, or some other term) can assert 
a claim to truth, and the effects these claims can have. Like other scholars, I have 
grown quite concerned about the gap between over-broad claims that have been made 
for the political potencies of non-fictional performances, especially in the popular 
press, and the more nuanced understandings of the complex dramaturgy of these 
pieces which one can find in the academic literature. Janelle Reinelt’s work expresses 
this tension. She acknowledges, of course, the “creative mediation” required in the 
craft of documentary theatre, and applauds those works which both demonstrate 
superior craftmanship and allow that craft to be seen.1 She explains the elements 
necessary for the dramatization (or aestheticization) of public events, and how these 
resemble those of more traditional dramatic forms, such as Ibsen (Reinelt 2010: 33). 
And yet, she (correctly) sees that most spectators are uninterested in these 
dramaturgical concerns and find a straightforward claim to historical accuracy far 
more compelling: “I don’t give a damn for all the nuanced arguments about the 
manipulation of facts and evidence”, Reinelt writes in the voice of her spectator. 
“This thing … DID HAPPEN, and it must be enough to clearly, persuasively, SAY 
SO” (Reinelt 2010: 39. Emphasis in source). This is not, to Reinelt, a form of 
cynicism or disingenuousness, but rather (at least the potential for) “an ethico-political 
revolt … a demonstration of caring, engagement and commitment to others” (Reinelt 
2010: 40). Yes, scholars such as Carol Martin analyse this truth-claim as a Barthean 
reality effect, “the result of a form of citation that confers [a certain] status of 
legitimacy upon the artwork” (Martin 2013: 5), but that analysis is quite far from the 
mind of Reinelt’s spectator, who expects from documentary performance a simple and 
compelling presentation of (often politically potent) facts. 
Of course, I agree that facts of the past are not, in themselves, simple or 
compelling, and that considerable dramaturgical craft is required in making plays that 
 
1 Reinelt 2009: 22. Her example is the performance of Vanessa Redgrave in Joan Didion’s The Year of 
Magical Thinking.  
are so, whether or not they are built out of documentary material. The documentary 
author Robin Soans is correct that non-fictional material imposes no “embargo on 
editing creatively” (Soans 2008: 35). And yet, I am concerned that these claims, no 
matter how true, blind us to the expectations of non-fictional theatre’s audiences, 
expectations shaped (at least) as much by the details of the social situation in which 
theatre finds itself as the dramaturgy of any individual piece. I do think theatre is a 
politically potent cultural practice, and can engage with contemporary political 
controversies in ways that other arts cannot.2 But we undermine that when we 
mischaracterize the nature of that engagement, or forget that the degree to which the 
theatre constitutes a distinct and autonomous field, distinguished from the rest of 
society and operating under its own rules, is always a matter of debate and 
contestation.3 When there is disagreement about which rules ought to govern a 
particular situation, scandals can erupt. Through these scandals, we can clarify what 
those rules are perceived to be by the public, even if they are not what scholars might 
suggest they ought to be. 
 
The performance 
For the past fifteen years, Mike Daisey has been an important solo performer in the 
American theatre world. His work has been seen in major regional theatres across the 
country, and he has a particular relationship with the Public Theatre of New York 
City. From 2010 until about 2014, he performed a monologue called The Agony and 
the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs with a chair, a table, and a glass of water. The piece tells the 
story of Daisey’s infatuation with Apple products, and his visit to the factories of 
Shenzhen, China where they are made. His discussion of both subjects is in the first 
person with no signs of the construction of a fictional character: spectators are led to 
believe that it is Daisey himself, the performer in front of them, is the same person 
who both takes extraordinary delight in tinkering with his electronic toys, and who 
visited Shenzhen and saw with his own eyes the horrific conditions their makers are 
 
2 This, importantly, includes documentary film, which is why I do not discuss it in this chapter. Briefly, 
the nature of the appeal to truth is quite different in film, where it is grounded in the camera’s ability to 
record images (and sounds) that would be perceptible to human eyes (and ears), had they been there. A 
documentary film need not base its claim to truth on the notion of testimony, as developed in this 
chapter. It may make use of it, of course, but it is a rare documentary film indeed that relies on it 
entirely. 
3 For more on this, see Edelman, Hansen and van der Hoogen, 2017. 
subject to. That tension is what holds the play together dramatically; we watch that 
dialectic between agony and ecstasy play out in Daisey’s body, voice, and words, and 
it draws us in. In his writing outside the play, Daisey claims that he does not write out 
his monologues in advance, working instead off a few pages of handwritten notes.4 I 
greatly doubt that each performance of one of his monologues differs substantially in 
its text from others, but the sense that the text is spontaneous, rather a recitation, does 
create a different, more emotional relationship between Daisey and his audiences. Of 
course, this is a technique used in most acting of realist fiction; my suggestion here is 
that Daisey’s goal at least as much to be an empathetic character to his audiences than 
to be an accurate witness. Visually, Daisey’s performance recalls that of other 
passionate, angry, self-reflective male American monologists, primarily Spalding 
Gray, of course, but also Eric Bogosian. But there is also a tradition of theatre 
presenting compelling documentary testimony of the political issues of the day, 
tracing back to the Living Newspaper of the Federal Theatre Project of the 1930s, to 
Teatro Campesino in the 1960s and 1970s, to Anna Deveare Smith’s interview-based 
performances of the 1990s, and recent verbatim plays, many of which are imported 
from Britain, South Africa, and elsewhere. These theatrical forms have a wide variety 
of aesthetics, but a similar aim of creating a theatre that, through its claim to truth, 
gains a political efficacy.  
Daisey is an irresistible storyteller: clear, playful, clever, and skilful but 
disarmingly self-deprecating, always seeming to be aware of the beautiful absurdity of 
an audience assembling to hear about the bad habits, neuroses, and travels of a large 
middle-aged American man in a ridiculous Hawaiian shirt. He casts a winning and 
charismatic figure with a positively Wildean wit, even if his visual style is far more 
schlub than dandy. He does not hesitate to use the first person plural in his monologue, 
drawing us into the absurdity of his own situation. For we spectators, too, are owners 
of Apple products, and we, too, have thought and perhaps worried about where and 
how these products are made. By identifying with Daisey, we spectators have a means 
of acknowledging our own latent anxiety about our own personal role in globalisation, 
 
4 For this claim, see Pressley 2012. Daisey has published what he describes as “transcripts” of these 
monologues on his website for others to use. He explains these as derivative works, developed from his 
performances, rather than the scripts which gave rise to them. Two versions of Agony and Ecstasy are 
posted on his website, one before and one after this controversy, which he calls versions 1.0 and 2.0, 
respectively. I will refer to both here. 
and even if Daisey’s self-portrayal reveals his own hypocrisy and neurosis, its charm 
makes it one we are willing to accept. 
The empathy which Daisey intended was not just a theatrical effect, but a 
political one as well. At the end of each performance, Daisey distributed what he 
called a “reverse programme”: a one-page flyer labelled “change is possible”, offering 
suggestions to the spectators who wanted to take practical action on the political issue 
of Chinese workers’ rights. Note that this flyer included not just Apple CEO Tim 
Cook’s email address, but specific suggestions as to what to ask him.5 Daisey also 
began appearing on American news talk shows, repeating his testimony about what he 
saw at the Apple supplier’s factories in China and calling on the company to improve 
its labour practices.6 
Trouble started when Daisey broadcast a portion of the piece on a American 
public radio programme and podcast produced by Chicago station WBEZ called This 
American Life, which is popular with the same broadly left-wing, well- educated and 
affluent audience that frequents the American theatre. Importantly, the radio show did 
not broadcast the portion of the performance in which Daisey’s confessed his love of 
Apple products, leaving only the portion where he described what he saw in the 
Shenzhen factories—underage workers, guards with guns, maimed and fired workers, 
and makers of an iPad who had never seen one and were astounded by its magic. The 
audience for This American Life was not just orders of magnitude larger than Daisey’s 
theatre audiences – millions instead of thousands – but it was a different audience too, 
with its own set of expectations. A few economics reporters who covered China found 
some details of Daisey’s accounts hard to believe – the guards with guns, meetings in 
Starbucks – and so they looked into it.7 They found Daisey’s translator, who 
confirmed that yes, many of the most grisly and memorable details were not things 
that had been seen or experienced by Daisey himself.  
 
5 Daisey reproduces these as the last page of the transcript of the monologue. It did not change between 
the first and second versions posted. See Daisey Feb. 2012: 62 and Daisey Sept. 2012: 70 respectively.  
6 See PBS Newshour, 14 April 2011, available online at 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/art/conversation-mike-daiseys-the-agony-and-the-ecstasy-of-steve-
jobs/>, and CBS News, “The dark side of shiny Apple products.”16 March 2012, available online at 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-dark-side-of-shiny-apple-products/>. 
7 The most important of these was Rob Schmitz, the China correspondent for the programme 
Marketplace on American Public Radio. See “Retracting ‘Mr. Daisey and the Apple Factory’.” This 






This American Life broadcast another episode in which it ‘retracted’ its earlier 
broadcast of Daisey’s work, and presented its own journalistic reporting on the labour 
situation in Apple’s Chinese factories. The programme’s host, Ira Glass, interviewed 
Daisey and asked him about his earlier deceit. After going through a number of the 
falsehoods in Daisey’s account, Glass asks Daisey for an explanation. His response is 
worth quoting at length for what it reveals about the sense of truth he is claiming for 
his work: 
 
Glass: I might be more inclined to believe you, but you admit to lying about so 
many little things-- the number of people who you spoke to, the number of 
factories that you visited. You admit to making up an entire group of characters 
who didn't exist, who were poisoned by hexane …. 
Daisey: All I can tell you is that I stand by what I told you before …  
Glass: That those things happened— 
Daisey: Yes. 
Glass: --those specific things? 
Daisey: And I stand by it as a theatrical work. I stand by how it makes people see 
and care about the situation that's happening there. I stand by it in the theater. 
And I regret deeply that it was put into this context, on your show. 
Glass: Are you going to change the way that you label this in the theater, so that 
the audience in the theater knows that this isn't, strictly speaking, a work of 
truth…? 
Daisey: I don't know that I would say in a theatrical context that it isn't true. I 
believe that when I perform it in a theatrical context in the theater, that when people 
hear the story in those terms, that we have different languages for what the truth 
means. 
Glass: I understand that you believe that, but I think you're kidding yourself, in 
the way that normal people who go to see a person talk-- people take it as a literal 
truth. .… I thought it was true, because you were on stage saying, this happened 
to me. I took you at your word.  
Daisey: I think you can trust my word in the context of the theater. And how 
people see it-- 
Glass: I find this to be a really hedgy answer. I think it's OK for somebody in 
your position to say that it isn't all literally true …. I feel like, actually, it seems 
like it's honest labelling …. You make a nice show. People are moved by it. I was 
moved by it. And if it were labelled honestly, I think everybody would react 
differently to it. 
Daisey: I don't think that label covers the totality of what it is. 
Glass: The label, "fiction?" 
Daisey: Yeah. We have different worldviews on some of these things. I agree that 
truth is really important. 
Glass: I know. But I feel like I have the normal worldview. The normal 
worldview is somebody stands on a stage and says, "This happened to me," I 
think it happened to them, unless it's clearly labelled, "Here's a work of fiction." 
Daisey: I really regret putting the show on This American Life. And it was wrong 
for me to misrepresent to you and to Brian that it could be on the show. (This 
American Life #460 2012: 18-19). 
 
Note that both Glass’s attack on the piece’s truth claim and Daisey’s defence of it are 
placed squarely within the context of live performance. On the one hand, Glass sees 
Daisey as claiming “you were on stage saying, this happened to me,” while Daisey 
defends the effects of the work on “people [ie, spectators] who hear the story in a 
theatrical context in the theatre”.8 Nevertheless, Glass’s scepticism at this explanation 
was shared by the small battalion of critics and commentators who accused Daisey of 
being a liar, a fabulist, or a simple self-promoter.9 David Carr, the New York Times’s 
media critic, was unequivocal: “Is it O.K. to lie on the way to lie on the way to telling 
a greater truth? The short answer is also the right one. No” (Carr 2012). Academic 
Sinologist Ralph Litzinger, like others with a professional interest in improving 
Chinese labour practices, writes that Daisey “will not be forgiven for his blurring of 
truth and fiction, for his journalistic posturing, for what some see as his arrogance to 
play the activist provocateur and tell us how we should relate to Apple and its dirty 
and dangerous supply chain” (Lizinger 2013: 176). 
By his lack of truthfulness about what he, personally, saw in Shenzhen, Daisey 
has muddied the waters about what is actually happening at the factories in Shenzhen 
and places like it, making the work of those campaigning for better work conditions 
more difficult. 
But those voices coming from within the theatre field itself—including 
performance scholars—were noticeably more forgiving to Daisey. While theatre 
critics such as Christopher Isherwood were not exactly flattering towards Daisey, they 
tended to see more nuance than their political colleagues.10 Daisey continued 
performing the piece, lightly edited, for months after the scandal broke, to enthusiastic 
responses. The performance was enthusiastically received at the Spoleto Festival in 
 
8 Elsewhere in the episode, Daisey adds. “I think it made you care, Ira. And I think it made you want to 
delve.” Ibid. 
9 A quick search will find a variety of blog posts and articles on the scandal in March of 2012. See 
Osnos 2012 and Fallows 2012. 
10 Compare the sources referenced in note 9 to Isherwood 2012. 
South Carolina a few months after the scandal broke, where academic reviewer 
Sharon Green “was surprised to discover the extent to which the ‘scandal’ itself 
misrepresented the story at the heart of Daisey’s performance” (Green 2013: 105-
106). 
Shannon Steen, a performance scholar at Berkeley who is one of the few who has 
written about the controversy, refuses to condemn Daisey’s falsehoods. She does see 
in his portrayal of Shenzhen and Hong Kong a disturbingly Orientalized view of 
China as the mysterious, unknowable other, but the relevant questions of truth she 
saw were those activated by the globalized economic culture that was the focus of 
Daisey’s work. Steen writes: 
 
The scandal around Agony focused neoliberalist investments in a strict division 
between art and fact—frequently termed throughout the scandal as the division 
between theatre and journalism—and ignored the overlapping systems of 
narrative that activate both (Steen 2014:12). 
 
Along these lines, she sees Daisey’s “force[d]... public confession” in This American 
Life’s retraction episode as not so much a setting-straight of the record as an 
“extensive ... flagellation” designed to reinforce the credibility of Glass and his public 
radio employer into the very neoliberal system that Daisey is condemning. In her 
view, the only problem with Agony the work only its orientalist tendencies; the larger 
scandals were the actual treatment of Apple’s workers the ritual humiliation of Daisey 
the artist who tried to bring attention to them. 
Perhaps the most ardent defence of Daisey’s work and the authority of its truth 
claims within the theatre field comes, unsurprisingly, from Daisey himself. Though he 
apologised on his blog and on the follow-on This American Life programme quoted 
above, he continued to perform an edited version of the piece which removed the 
specific claims that had been debunked. In performing this modified version, 
however, he was defiant and unapologetic, standing, in Green’s words, “behind the 
integrity of the truth at the centre of his story, even with its contested details” (Green 
2013: 105). But the nature of that defence of the “integrity of his truth” —what other 
scholars, such as Ashley Barnwell, might call “authenticity” (2014: 710)— is 
interesting. In the revised version, Daisey removed the (likely untrue) story of a 
Shenzhen factory worker whose hand had been mangled by the chemical hexane in 
building iPads but had never seen one; Daisey takes out his and shows it to him, and 
he calls it “magic”. In its place, Daisey chooses something less dramatically 
compelling but much more defiant: 
 
And I hear these stories all day long.  
But...why believe me?  
I am, after all, a noted fabulist. Perhaps none of this is true.  
Wouldn’t that be comforting? Perhaps your electronics are made by Oompa-
Loompas.  
A benighted tribe of Oompa-Loompas, saved by saintly Steve Jobs, they work in 
a beautifully apportioned factory. And these Oompa-Loompas all have a severe 
OCD disorder, so they actually love assembling little tiny electronics the same 
exact way over and over and over, it’s working out wonderfully (Daisey Sept. 
2012: 61). 
 
Certainly, there would be a comedy in these lines that does not easily translate to the 
page, but what this passage is mocking is the scandal itself. The comedy here comes 
from Daisey’s ridiculous exaggeration of the claims of his critics. Of course, no 
commentator has suggested that Chinese labour conditions are good, or that (some of) 
the sorts of things Daisey described do not tend to happen in the sorts of factories he 
is describing. Glass and the other critics’ charge is that Daisey has reported that he 
saw things that, in fact, he did not, which is an affront to journalism. But Daisey’s 
new version makes no effort to defend these details. His claims, instead, rest on the 
traditional theatrical identification between Daisey and his spectators described above. 
The claim to authenticity and truth comes from Daisey’s ability to share his affective 
discomfort with how his beloved Apple products are made with his audience. This 
discomfort is grounded in facts, but the details are not the important point. If we focus 
on them, Daisey is arguing, we lose our focus on the situation in which Apple 
products are made, which would be inauthentically “comforting.”  
But to define this affective coherence and comparability as “true for theatre” is 
something that very few outside of the theatre field would recognize. Saying that 
affective coherence can be equated with truth is incompatible with what Glass calls 
the “normal worldview” that he would expect members of the general public to have 
when attending a performance. 
It is not that Daisey is wrong, or that defenders such as Steen do not have a point. 
Theatre works affectively, even documentary theatre; it makes no sense to judge the 
arts but the standards of journalism. The documentary playwright Robin Soans puts 
this well: 
 
To declare that, because [documentary theatre’s] subjects are real, they have to be 
portrayed in a way that fictional characters are not, is to undermine the power of 
the verbatim playwright. It prevents the tailoring of the material to make it 
political, emotional or even theatrical (Soans 2008: 35). 
 
I agree with this, as I do with Steen’s and Green’s observations that the scandal ought 
not be relevant for the basic artistic and political work done by Daisey’s piece. And 
yet it was relevant for the vast majority of those outside the theatre field. There was 
an enormous gap between how the majority of the cultural field viewed Daisey’s 
actions and how the theatre field did. When Daisey tried to articulate his theatrical 
notion of truth to Glass—an idea not so dissimilar to that of Soans, quoted above—
the radio host simply could not understand him. 
The Daisey affair, then, was a particular sort of theatrical scandal: one in which 
the scandal was not so much within the theatre but in the eyes of those outside of it. In 
itself, that is striking, but if we want to hold on to the idea that the theatre we make 
and study speaks to a more general public – even an educated, elite public like the 
producers and listeners of This American Life – it becomes a serious problem. 
The Public Theatre itself, the New York venue for Agony, saw this problem more 
clearly than most, perhaps because they need to find common cause with so many 
benefactors and audience members. The theatre’s director, Oskar Eustis, released a 
statement noting that “every performance creates a contract, implied or explicit, 
between the stage and the audience,” and apologizing for their failure to “fulfil” that 
contract with Agony (Hetrick 2012). This is surely accurate, and a useful way forward. 
How did the performance, intentionally or otherwise, set up a contract with the 
audience about the truth of what they were seeing? How, precisely, did the piece 
violate that contract? And what does this suggest about theatre’s ability to make truth 
claims within the frame of drama? 
 
Negotiating genres of fact and fiction 
Stephen Bottoms has suggested that in order to help us negotiate the truth claims and 
constructed nature of documentary theatre, we need theatre which does not just use 
texts and testimonies, but displays the contingent ways in which documents and 
testimonies are used to construct a dramatic work, so that the audiences can maintain 
a critical distance from what they are being shown, rather than being swallowed up by 
it (Bottoms 2006). This view has become quite influential, and as scholars, we have 
become quite proficient in the ways in which stories and their truth claims fluctuate, 
unmoor, and morph in the act of telling and re-telling. This form of asserting authority 
is, in Eustas’s terms, part of the contract between performer and audience, which may 
be unstable but nevertheless grounds the key social relationship of the theatrical 
event. But this will not help us understand this scandal. Agony and Ecstasy displays 
Daisey’s process openly, but not accurately. It had a clear contract; it simply did not 
adhere to its terms. 
D. Soyini Madison, Professor of Performance Studies at Northwestern, wrestles 
through this confusion through notions of labour and the relationship between 
performer and audience. In her article on the Daisey affair and the biopolitics of 
labour, she cites Jill Dolan and José Muñoz in explaining the appeal of Daisey’s work 
to its audience as a sharing of space, anticipation, affect and labour which she 
connects with the idea of a “utopian performative”, not a desire for information.11 She 
writes: “These bodies, seated before a live stage, are not seeking facts; they are 
seeking ephemeral transcendence, hopefully a transcendence to be remembered” 
(Madison 2012: 239). 
She sees the “virtuosic” Daisey as the David to Apple’s Goliath, and as 
succeeding in his task through the affective potency of his performance. This makes 
his falsehoods all the more frustrating. “All he had to do was stand strong in the 
informed passion of his imagination. More than annoyed by his lies, most of us are 
befuddled as to why this compelling performer felt the lies were necessary” (Madison 
2012: 240). On the one hand, strict details were not the means by Agony’s authority 
was authenticated to its audience, so these deceits were not necessary. And yet, their 
revelation did seem to undermine that authority; if not, why the annoyance and 
befuddlement? 
Madison’s argument, as well as Eustis’s, suggest a confusion over the question of 
genre. Eustis’s “contract”, one could assume, is established prior to the performance, 
 
11 Though these concepts can be found throughout Dolan and Muñoz’s work, Madison 2006 
specifically cites their respective essays.  
though labelling, marketing, reviews, playbills, or other information provided by the 
theatre, even if that genre may be played with or modified over the course of the 
work. Glass also alludes to this in asking that Agony be re-labelled as fictional. The 
difficulty is that politically-engaged or non-fictional theatre is not one genre but an 
entire spectrum of them. There are, of course, a variety of ways in which theatre can 
make use of real political controversies, from the clearly fictionalized (Philadelphia, 
Here I Come! on Irish emigration), to the semi-fictionalized (Behind the Beautiful 
Forevers, or more controversially, David Hare’s Stuff Happens), to the self-
consciously and visibly constructed from interviews (London Road, Fires in the 
Mirror, I Am My Own Wife), to the strictly verbatim (Norton-Taylor’s tribunal plays, 
such as The Colour of Justice, or even My Name is Rachel Corrie). Some of these 
latter plays are written by self-professed journalists, not playwrights, and they lay 
claim to both a theatrical narrativity and a journalistic accuracy. But if a single line in 
Colour of Justice or Rachel Corrie did not accurately reflect its source text, the 
authenticity of the piece would collapse. I stress that I have absolutely no reason to 
think that such inaccuracies appear in any of these texts. But if they did, these pieces 
would violate their contract with their audience as theatre, not just as journalism. 
And yet, Agony is hard to place on this axis partially because it stands on another 
one as well, that of the autobiographical monologue play. On the one end, one might 
find stand-up comedians such as Stephen Colbert or Rachel Bloom or who lend their 
own name (or nearly; Bloom’s character is named “Rebecca Bunch”) to a developed 
character which, though not unrelated to themselves, has a comic absurdity which 
invites its audience to see them as distinct from their creator. On the other end would 
be the public testimony of personal narratives, such as that of public “story slams” 
such as The Moth or Yael Farber’s first-person narratives of trauma from apartheid in 
South Africa.  Somewhere in the middle would stand those who Daisey most 
resembles: monologists like Spalding Gray and Eric Bogosian, whose 
autobiographical performances are personal, dramatic, and based on an empathetic 
relationship with the audience. 
These autobiographical plays represent a different genre than that of documentary 
theatre. Even though both make a claim to truth, the two make that claim in quite 
different ways. The documentary theatre tradition grounds its claim to truth in the 
authority of written documents: reports, transcripts, letters, court decisions, and the 
like. One of the foundational texts of the contemporary documentary theatre genre is 
Peter Weiss’s 1968 manifesto, which begins: 
 
The documentary theatre is a theatre of factual reports …. The 
documentary theatre shuns all invention. It makes use of authentic documentary 
material which it diffuses from the stage, without altering the contents, but in 
structurating [sic] the form. In opposition to the incoherent mass of information 
which constantly assails us from every side, it presents a selection which 
converges towards a precise and generally social or political theme (Weiss 1968: 
375). 
 
While subsequent documentary theatremakers have developed the form in the past 
half-century, what is interesting here is that authenticity of the documentary form 
rests in its strict reliance on documents – “factual reports”, “documentary material”. 
Weiss encourages editing, cutting, and structural innovation to clarify and hone the 
play’s purpose – at one point in his manifesto, he suggests the use of songs “for the 
purpose of presenting reports” (Weiss 1968: 389) – but while he is open to 
dramaturgical experiment, the genre would lose its authenticity if it were to invent 
new content. This work, according to Weiss, is inherently public and political, and 
seeks to criticise the nefarious public practices of “camouflage”, “the falsification of 
reality” and “lying” through the authority of its use of documents (Weiss 1968: 376). 
This is a genre in which the notion of truth is essentially a textual one. Contemporary 
documentary theatre makers who ground their works in interviews stretch that 
definition of document somewhat, but they do not break it.  
This is quite different from the authenticity claimed by the autobiographical 
performances, which is grounded not in a document but in the performer’s own lived 
experience.12 Unlike a document, that experience is necessarily subjective and cannot 
be fully re-created through text or performance, and it can only capture fragments of 
the original event. As such, if our goal is to re-construct the original experience, 
inaccuracy in small details are not crucial; even if some aspects are untrue, they speak 
to the memory and experience of the witness, and their poetic form may also provide 
 
12 Amanda Stuart Fisher makes this point with regards to the work of Yael Farber. She writes: “Unlike 
verbatim or documentary theatre, [Farber’s plays] are not drawn from reportage or documentary 
evidence. Instead Farber harnesses the power of poetry, metaphor and song to crat together theatre texts 
that bear witness to actual lived experience. The authenticity of these stories rests less on their claim to 
factual veracity, instead it emerges from the “testimonial truth” of the witness presented before us. 
(2008). 
insight into the way that experience has been shaped in the mind. Very often, these 
plays foreground the difficulties of memory and reconstruction, using the piece’s own 
dramaturgy to model the effort of the subject (who is also the performer) to shape 
their memory into a coherent whole. Carol Martin describes this process in one of the 
most discussed examples of this genre, Spalding Gray’s Rumstick Road: 
 
Gray used his preoccupation with his own life to illuminate how ephemeral the 
real can seem, how memory can escape us, and how we might be haunted by the 
presence of the past, how one can live the past as an eternal present …. Gray’s 
unsentimental creation … simultaneously locate[d his] life as material for his 
performance and as performance itself - the actor as actor, a subject alongside the 
life the actor acts (Martin 2012: 47). 
 
Thus, what is being staged here is not so much an experience taken from memory as 
the act of memorial reconstruction, haunting, and return and the nature of the subject 
who undertakes them. While this focus on interiority and process makes 
autobiography into a “semifictive” form (Heddon 2008:4), this does not mean it gives 
up any link with truth; an autobiography revealed to be wholly invented would no 
longer be testimony to an actual experience, and would thus lose its authority. But this 
is a very different criterion than the reliance on documentary material which 
characterises documentary theatre. 
This, I would argue, is the basic issue at play between Glass and Daisey. Glass 
saw Agony as a piece of documentary theatre. Daisey saw it as a personal testimonial. 
The two genres have moved together in recent decades and now overlap, but the 
audience expectations as to the sorts of truth claims that will be made in one remain 
quite different than that of the other,13 This could, then, simply be a mislabelling and 
misunderstanding. If Daisey had simply made clear to his audience and to Glass that 
the piece was first and foremost about his experience rather than about Apple’s labour 
 
13 Some of the most interesting cases of overlap come from Moíses Kaufman and the Tectonic Theatre 
Project. In different ways, both The Three Trials of Oscar Wilde and Laramie Project combine the two 
genres. Both structure their narratives around documentary material – letters and court transcripts in the 
first, and interviews in the second – but contextualise them with first-person testimonials from the 
Tectonic members who engaged in the research, conducted the interviews, and assembled the piece. 
What we have, then, is both the “factual report” of the document, but also testimony to the personal 
experience of engaging and developing those facts. These works’ dialectical structure between the 
personal and the objective makes them particularly apt responses to Stephen Bottoms’s concerns, 
quoted above. 
 
practices, the implied contract would not have been violated and perhaps would have 
been much less of a scandal (though the piece would likely have attracted less 
attention). 
But I would argue that this lets Daisey off too lightly. Even taking the piece as 
containing more testimonial than documentary elements, Daisey has violated the trust 
of his audience. To justify this claim, and to explain how we as scholars and citizens 
can respond to Agony’s truth claims, I will need to explore what I have glossed as the 
“autobiographical genre” more deeply. This genre is sometimes called testimonial 
theatre or theatre of witness, and in the last few decades, a considerable scholarship 
has developed on testimony and witnessing, both in the theatre and beyond. That 
literature is vast, and I cannot summarise it here. For my purposes, though, I want to 
highlight three brief points from it, each building on the previous, and then apply 
them to the present case. 
 
Witnessing true and false 
First, many theorists have discussed the necessarily unbridgeable gap between 
testimony and the events that the testimony describes. One cannot directly read the 
latter from the former. This is especially the case for testimony of traumatic 
experiences, which are especially difficult to assimilate into sense and thus similarly 
resist being somehow “captured” in testimony about them. Scholarship on the 
testimony to trauma began in earnest after the horrors of the Holocaust and has 
continued as testimony plays such an important role in addressing past political 
traumas such as apartheid (on this, see Martin 2015). But the gap between experience 
and testimony to that experience does not require trauma; it is a property of all 
testimony as such. While the traumatic nature of an experience makes that gap more 
visible and starker—and thus more interesting for theorists—it does not, in itself, 
create the gap. Daisey’s experience in China, while challenging, was not traumatic. 
But there is still a necessary gap between that experience and his testimony to it, 
which will affect our analysis of its truth claims. 
Michael Bernard-Donals discusses the case of Fragments, a book written by a 
Swiss author who went by the name Binjamin Wilkomirski, which presents itself as 
the memoir of a Nazi death camp survivor.14 While the author certainly had a difficult 
childhood, he seems not to have spent any time in the camps; the narrative was 
composed from fragments of the memories of others and the work of his 
imagination—not, frankly, unlike Agony. Bernard-Donals is slightly hesitant to 
condemn Wilkmonirski, arguing that because history and memory have such a vexed 
relationship, testimony, which draws on memory, cannot serve as a transparent 
window onto history. And so memories of this never-really-experienced event are 
necessarily full of aporias, gaps, impressions, inarticulable sensations. “The traumatic 
event remains unknown,” Bernard-Donals writes (2009: 90). He quotes Lyotard’s 
claim that it is not enough for testimony to claim that an event was seen. It also needs 
to “len[d] an ear to what which is not presentable under the rules of knowledge”.15 
Thus testimony has an authority, but one that “is relatively autonomous from history” 
(Bernard-Donals 2009: 53), as the act of testimony requires a displacement or erasure 
of the event and its replacement with the (connected but distinct) act of witnessing. 
This leads to the second point, that the carrier and the authorizer of testimony is 
not a document or a fact, but the embodied witness themselves. A witness makes a 
claim to the continuity of their own presence between the moment of the event and the 
moment of testimony. Thus, testimony privileges live performance; we as an audience 
are confronted with the presence of the very body that encountered the event. In 
Derrida’s language, the witness is “the one who will have been present. He or she will 
have been present at, in the present to the thing to which he [or she] testifies”.16 If one 
were not so present, one would be bearing false witness. But this is a problem, of 
course – it depends on the witness’s self-presence in the moment of the event being 
testified to, which is not straightforward. Derrida continues that the witness can be 
present only on the condition of being “sufficiently conscious of himself, sufficiently 
self-present to know what he [or she] is talking about”.17 For traumatic events, this 
poses a problem; there is an important sense in which the victim of trauma may not be 
conscious of themselves in this manner during the traumatic event; what can be 
testified to, then, is not so much the event itself, but its aftereffects. Even if one is 
sceptical of this line of reasoning, there is the larger problem that survivors of some 
 
14 Bernard-Donals 2009: specifically chapter 5. 
15 Lyotard 1989: 57 quoted in Bernard-Donals 2009: 86.  
16 Derrida 2005: 74, quoted and discussed in Wake 2009: 86. 
17 Derrida 2005: 79, quoted in Wake 2009: 86. 
traumas— precisely because they are survivors – cannot have experienced the 
fullness of the trauma. This echoes Primo Levi’s famous argument that “we, the 
survivors, is are not the true witnesses” of the Holocaust (Levi 1986:70); only the 
dead can have been said to have endured the trauma in its fullness. 
Again, as Daisey’s Chinese experience was not in itself traumatic, there is no 
reason to think that he was detached from his experience in the way that the subject of 
trauma would be. It is, in fact, the continuity of his bodily presence between Shenzhen 
and the theatre that is at issue. We have thus identified a specific way in which his 
testimony is deficient. But if one is inclined to be exceedingly generous, it could be 
argued that he is engaging in the classic actorly craft of presenting someone else’s 
experience as his own. After all, there is little in Daisey’s piece that was not 
experienced by someone. This gap between an actor’s experience and a character’s, 
the gap covered by Stanislavski’s Magic If, may be seen as analogous—formally, if 
not ethically—to the gap between the experience of the those who can testify and the 
“true witnesses” who are unable to do so. 
If we as critics are willing to take that step—which the scandal suggests that most 
of the public are not—then we can see how those aporias can be addressed (not 
bridged) by means of the traditional crafts of a performer who brings a dramatic text 
to life, whether documentary or otherwise. Carol Martin puts this activation in the 
familiar terms of the still and silent archive and the living, compelling repertoire. “It is 
precisely what is not in the archive, what is added by making the archive into 
repertory, that infuses documentary theatre with its particular theatrical vitality,” she 
writes (Martin 2010: 20). But for theorists of testimony less grounded in performance 
studies, this enthusiasm may sound like papering over of a paradox that ought to be 
displayed. Kelly Oliver described the paradox of testimony: 
 
It is the performance of testimony, not merely what is said, that makes it effective 
in bringing to life a repetition of an event, not a repetition of the facts of the 
event, or the structure of the event, but the silences and the blindness inherent in 
the event that, at bottom, also makes eyewitness testimony impossible (Oliver 
2001: 86). 
 
This would suggest, perhaps frustratingly, that Daisey’s skills as a storyteller in fact 
make his testimony more effective, regardless of its veracity. 
This leads to the final point: a piece of testimony is effective if it places an 
(appropriate) affective and ethical burden on the audience to respond in a certain way, 
not just in the moment of performance, but after. That burden is somehow akin the 
one the witness bears themselves. Caroline Wake refers to this as being a “spectator in 
the moment but witnesses in and through time” and this phenomenon as the “after-
affect” of the performance of testimony (Wake 2009: 85). Oliver continues that this is, 
again, not a matter of the historicity of the witness’s account: “My earlier analysis 
suggests that it is not the reality of one’s [ie, the witnesses’] experience that obligates 
a response. Rather, it is subjectivity as response-ability itself that obligates a response 
- not just any response, but a response that nourishes the possibility of response” 
(Oliver 2001: 108). 
And it is just this ability that makes Bernard-Donals hesitate to dismiss the book 
Fragments with its untrue narrative as merely pastiche or lies. It compels such a 
response, even if its facts are wrong. “Testimonial narratives don't disclose history,” 
he writes. “instead they disclose - where the narrative most clearly shows its seams - 
the effect of events upon witnesses” (Bernald-Donals 2009: 89).18 
And this is of course the reason for Daisey’s reverse programme – his narrative, 
too, provokes this affective, ethical response in his audiences, and he would like to 
channel it. There is a tradition of calling this response “secondary witnessing” (see, 
for instance, Apel 2002 and Assmann 2006), but Wake is sceptical that we can neatly 
divide primary from secondary witnessing. These theorists agree, however, that acts 
of witnessing provoke further acts of witnessing in their audience, and thus 
performances of witness in a controlled setting such as the theatre do not so much tell 
us the truth of an event as teach us how to witness and the potency and responsibility 
that such an act entails. 
By this logic, there is a certain legitimacy to Daisey’s claim to truth. He provoked 
an appropriate response in his audience, he had in fact been to China and could 
imaginatively recreate the remainder of his experience, and if we take the distance 
between testimony and experience seriously, then his embellishments are not relevant. 
And whether or not Daisey himself is personally acquainted with this scholarship, this 
form of justification of testimonial performance circulates within the theatrical field in 
which he operates. It is not unreasonable to think that he has absorbed some of it. On 
 
18 One might quibble with the nature of such “effects” and suggest that affect theory or Levinasian 
ethics would be helpful here, but the point stands. 
these enthusiastic terms, then, it does make sense to talk about the truth of Daisey’s 
performance. 
But of course we cannot accept these terms, and for one very simple reason. He 
has broken the chain of experience; his testimony rests on the assertion of a 
connection between himself and events that is not true. While trauma or the 
difficulties of testimony may mean that some experiences which did occur struggle to 
be realised in testimony, it is not the case that experiences which do allow themselves 
to be testified to therefore did occur. As a consequence, we cannot even say that 
Daisey’s testimony was effective. While it did provoke a certain response in its 
audience—the aesthetic and political reaction that Daisey the theatremaker 
intended—because the chain of witnessing had been broken, we cannot talk about this 
as an ethically appropriate response by the audience. At best, they are innocent dupes. 
This is not the case of a trauma victim using artistic tools to attempt to re-create the 
fragments of their own disjointed experience. This is the case of a constructed piece 
of testimony built on false premises. 
My suggestion, then, is to take Agony not as a piece of documentary theatre, but 
as a form of testimonial. This means that Daisy is not a failed documentarian, but a 
false witness. The structure and presentation of his performance led us –the audience– 
to take his performance as a form of testimony. His body and his physical 
performance were put forward as evidence of the truth of what he had witnessed in 
another place and another time, and this made not just aesthetic but also moral 
demands on its audience to respond. Because testimony has the ability to make these 
demands that other forms of speech acts do not, there are certain social rules to which 
it is subject which other speech acts are not. Mike Daisey presented his piece as 
testimony, but did so under false pretences. Daisey is thus not a simple liar; he is a 
perjurer. 
I think this phrasing can also help us understand why the public found Daisey’s 
falsehoods more scandalous than they might either Spalding Grey’s self-exaggeration 
or a trauma survivor who gave incorrect details about their experience. Simple errors 
in testimonials are not, in themselves, scandalous; the gap between experience and 
testimony means that we do not expect witnesses to be objective repeaters of factual 
detail. The Biblical commandment I allude to in my title prohibits the bearing of false 
witness against a neighbour, which we can understand as a very large category but 
one that includes only other beings, not the self. Misleading an audience about one’s 
internal emotional life may be a form of lying, but we can begin to understand it as a 
different category, one which perhaps deserves a different sort of judgment. 
Witnessing in this sense requires an object; one can witness for or against another, but 
testimony that focuses only on the inner life on the self does not necessarily have the 
same moral force as testimony to the acts of another (and the consequences of that for 
the self). It also may not have the transmissible, response- generating relation to its 
audience that Oliver and Wake describe. Witnessing is, thus, a particular potent 
relationship of ethical responsibility that human beings can take towards one another 
and, like most responsibilities, it can be abused. 
This language also allows one (if one wishes) to articulate the strongest possible 
claim that could be made against Daisey. Most ethical and religious traditions 
condemn falsehood in general, of course, but distinguish between the sins of boasting, 
gossip, and false witness. All are deceitful, but the last is particularly egregious and 
dangerous because of its authority, the way it presents the other, and the demands it 
places on its audience to respond. When a witness engages in the heightened form of 
speech we call testimony, that person is taking on an ethical responsibility that they 
would not have in the simple situation of a gossip with friends, nor would they 
necessarily have in an act of fictional or even documentary art. The anger that many 
activists, in particular, had for Daisey comes from the fact that, to use religious 
langauge, he bore false witness against them. Through his false statements, he hurt 
their cause. He cast unnecessary doubt on the suffering of the workers he was hoping 
to help, and failed to take account of their full, complex, inconvenient human 
experiences, instead manipulating them to serve his own narrative needs. Precisely 
because it is so simultaneously fragile and compelling, the link between the witness, 
their experience, and their testimony to that experience needs to be respected and 
treated with the highest degree of honesty. Daisey’s violation of those expectations 
was particularly painful and offensive because of that fragility and power. Rather than 
opening up the possibility of future witnessing, Daisey’s perjury hinders the 
effectiveness of testimony of future witnesses to labour injustices who may come 
forward. The distrust and scepticism we have learned from Daisey will poison our 
ability to respond to future witnesses in an ethically and affectively appropriate 
register.  
In closing, I want to return to the question I began with through my citation of 
Reinelt. There does appear to be a substantial gap between the ways that scholars and 
the general public view truth claims in non-fiction theatre. There seems to be a 
generosity in the former that does not exist with the latter, as this scandal has 
demonstrated. Much scholarship on witnessing and testimonial in the theatre is highly 
laudatory towards the complex, subtle and deeply humane work that theatrical 
testimony can accomplish. But if we wish to make the claim that theatre can serve as 
a potent and genuine form of witnessing, we need to accept that that this witness may 
be false. To deny the possibility of theatre bearing false witness is to deny the 
possibility that it can bear any sort of witness at all.  
Of course, it is our job as scholars to develop new concepts for the understanding 
and analysis of our subject matter, and in academic circles, we may use concepts that 
are not yet known or embraced by the public at large, or by the professionals whose 
work we study. But theatre is a public art form. And that means that we need to be 
aware of the patterns and expectations that audiences and the public bring with them, 
whether or not we think these expectations are legitimate. In this case, factual 
inaccuracy in the context of testimony would be scandalous to all “normal” audience 
members (to use Glass’s term). While we may wish to dissect those truth claims more 
finely, we as scholars and artists should have realised that any attempt to justify these 
inaccuracies would have been met with furor and incredulity by those who made up 
the bulk of Daisey’s (and Glass’s) audiences. 
Both the academic enterprise and the art of theatre have a certain autonomy, a 
certain distance and demarcation between themselves as fields and other aspects of 
society. And yet, I think most of us would like to see a theatre – and a theatre 
scholarship – that engages with the world around it. Doing so requires a constant 
effort not to deny that distance but to bridge it, in our research, in our teaching, and in 
our performance work. Public scandals such as Daisey’s give us an opportunity to 
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